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FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A CURE WORSE
THAN THE DISEASE
Gerald F. Uelmen*
Judge Heaney's compelling critique of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
finds resonance in the Ninth Circuit. The deep level of dissatisfaction with
the Guidelines in this circuit was reflected in a resolution adopted by the
1991 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference in Maui, Hawaii. The resolution
urged the Judicial Conference of the United States to recommend that
Congress make the Sentencing Guidelines permissive and non-binding. The
resolution was approved by a vote of 172 to 28, with eighty-five percent of
the judges in attendance voting in its favor.' A highly respected district
judge of the circuit, Judge J. Lawrence Irving of San Diego, recently an-
nounced his retirement from the bench with a searing critique of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines. In his view, the Guidelines required him to im-
pose sentences that were irrational: "If I remain on the bench, I have no
choice but to follow the law. I just can't, in good conscience, continue to do
this. " 2
I recently had occasion to moderate a panel discussion of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines at the University of San Diego Law School3 and
encountered an enormous sense of frustration among the one hundred law-
yers and judges participating. There is a widespread and pervasive feeling
that no one is listening in Washington, and that urgent demands for
Guideline reforms are simply being ignored. Those who created the Guide-
lines are so wedded to their tenacious defense that they remain oblivious to
the systemic dissonance they have created. The Federal Sentencing Com-
mission, and the Congress which created it, simply are not getting the mes-
sage, although the message could not be clearer: Your cure is worse than
the disease.4
* A.B., Loyola Marymount University, 1962; J.D., L.L.M., Georgetown University Law Center,
1965, 1966. Dean and Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Dean Uelmen cur-
rently serves as Chair of the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar of California, and as Co-Chair of
the Rules Advisory Committee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
I. 9TH CIRCUIT NEws. CONFERENCE EDITION, Fall 1991, at 4.
2. Alexander Wohl, The Calculus of Rationality, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 37, 39.
3. Panel on Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Revolution in Criminal Justice, held by the University
of San Diego School of Law (Nov. 23, 1991).
4. PUBLIUS, MAXIM 301: "There are some remedies worse than the disease." Cf. PLUTARCH. LIVES,
CAIUS MARIUS: "I see the cure is not worth the pain"; FRANCIS BACON. ESSAYS. OF SEDITIONs: "The
remedy is worse than the disease"; FRANCIS BEAUMONT AND JOHN FLETCHER. LOVE'S CURE, act Ill, §
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Like Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr.,5 I "grew up" under the old system
of unlimited judicial discretion with regard to imposing sentences within
statutory limits. I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Central Dis-
trict of California from 1966-1970, participating in federal sentencing pro-
ceedings for hundreds of criminal defendants. Since 1970, I have combined
my academic career with frequent appearances on the side of the defense
in criminal cases, often in federal court. I probably exercised greater power
over the lives of others as a federal prosecutor than I have in any position
since. I exercised it at a time in my life when I was least prepared to do
so, to the extent that life experience, maturity, humility, and thoughtful
reflection prepare one to exercise power over the lives of others. Still, ulti-
mate power resided in the hands of the judges who imposed the final sen-
tence. The task of fashioning an appropriate sentence called for an exercise
of discretion I have always regarded as the zenith of the judicial craft.
With rare exceptions, the men and women who exercised that discretion
were eminently equipped to do so. Granted, the results were not completely
predictable, but great disparity was the exception rather than the rule.
My experience suggested that a bank robber in Los Angeles was less
concerned about his sentence being greater than the sentence imposed on a
bank robber in Dallas, than he was about his sentence being greater than
the co-defendant in the same case, who talked him into participating in the
robbery. Disparity is dissipated by distance. Proportionality is most essen-
tial when it is coterminous. The task of apportioning justice based on the
relative culpability of co-defendants in the same case is where the rubber
hits the road in sentencing. That task was generally managed quite well by
judges under the "old system." The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, quite
simply, take that task away from judges and turn it over to prosecutors.
Prosecutors, I would contend, are ill-equipped to perform the ultimate
function of apportioning justice among the plethora of defendants who play
varying roles in the typical criminal enterprises prosecuted in federal courts
today.
An example of such a typical enterprise was recently utilized for a Ninth
Circuit Sentencing Institute.6 It involved three co-defendants in a cocaine
distribution scheme. Adams is the supplier, Baker a distributor, and Carter
a messenger. All three are arrested during the sale of 550 grams of cocaine
to an undercover agent, after a prior sale of 56.7 grams. An automobile is
seized at the time of the arrest, and a loaded pistol is found in the glove
ii: "I find the medicine worse than the malady."
5. Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines Debate at the Georgetown University Law
Center (Nov. 13, 1991) (Judge Wilkins debated Judge Heaney, the former supporting the Guidelines).
6. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEN-
TENCING INSTITUTE, Case 2 (Sept. 29, 1991).
[Vol. 29:899
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compartment.
Adams, the supplier, is a twenty-eight year old college graduate who has
supported a luxurious lifestyle through dealing in drugs. He cuts a deal to
plead guilty to possession of 500 grams or more for distribution. Based on
his cooperation in providing information about his sources of supply, the
prosecution moves for a sentence below the mandatory minimum and below
Guidelines,' and recommends a sentence of eighteen months.
Baker, a twenty-one year old addict and street dealer, goes to trial and is
convicted by a jury. He has three prior convictions for relatively minor
offenses. Including adjustments for being an "organizer" 8 and for possess-
ing a weapon, 9 he faces a sentence under the Guidelines at level thirty,
from nine years to eleven years and three months.
Carter is a twenty-two year old addicted prostitute, whose role in the
offense was limited to conveying telephone messages. She pleads guilty to
the transaction involving 56.7 grams of cocaine. Because of prior prostitu-
tion convictions, she falls into Criminal History Category IV. Since the full
amount of drugs in both transactions must be utilized as the "relevant con-
duct,"'" she faces a Guideline sentence of five years and three months to
six years and six months, even if she is given reductions for "minimal"
participation in the offense" and acceptance of responsibility.12
Thus, the addicted prostitute who took telephone messages goes off to
federal prison for five or six years, the addict street dealer gets at least
nine years, while the sophisticated supplier who organized the enterprise
ends up with an eighteen-month sentence.
We used this example at the San Diego symposium, and it was fascinat-
ing to watch the participating judges squirming to find some way to manip-
ulate the Guidelines to achieve a more just result. No one disagreed that
sending Baker and Carter away for longer terms than Adams was an injus-
tice, but no one could come up with a plausible way to reverse that result.
With prosecutorial contrivance, much could be accomplished, however.
That's the whole point. Under the "old system," judicial discretion could
be relied upon to accomplish justice. Fifty seasoned trial judges would not
come out very differently on this case. I am confident none of the fifty
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988) (providing courts with limited authority to depart from statutory
minimums); UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5Kl (1987) (defendant's substantial assis-
tance to authorities is valid reason to depart from the Guidelines) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
8. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 3B1.l,
9. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 2DI.l.
10. See United States v. Rosales, 917 F.2d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990) (defendant's claimed knowl-
edge of amount of drugs, which was less than the actual amount, was irrelevant in determining offense
level); United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1989) (court viewed son's aiding and abet-
ting part of cocaine business as aiding and abetting entire business).
11. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 3BI.2.
12. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 3E.
1992]
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would conclude that Carter deserved to spend four times as long in jail as
Adams. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the judges would have little
choice in the matter. The prosecutor would. And fifty seasoned prosecutors
would certainly include more than a few who would rigidly enforce the
Guidelines while giving the most culpable defendant a pass.
There is one aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that I would
regard as an improvement over the "old system": the availability of appel-
late review. Judge Wilkins, however, implies that appellate review and rigid
mandatory guidelines go hand in hand. This is not necessarily so. Many
jurisdictions have achieved a higher level of consistency in sentencing by
allowing appellate review of sentences in the context of a system retaining
broad discretion for the sentencing judge.13
Most of the sentencing appeals currently flooding the federal courts do
not even address the underlying problem of disparity in sentences. They are
exercises in nitpicking over the ambiguities which riddle the Guidelines
themselves." The judgments that make the biggest difference to the de-
fendant, such as whether the defendant was "contrite," or played a "mi-
nor" role in the offense, get short shrift from appellate judges.15 A rational
system of appellate review of the exercise of sentencing discretion does not
depend upon the existence of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Guidelines generally serve to misdirect appellate resources and exacerbate
the problem of sentencing disparity.
The problem of sentencing disparity is not unique to the federal criminal
justice system. Only the federal system has produced a solution which out-
weighs the Manhattan telephone directory, however. It is a classic example
of overkill which denigrates the federal judiciary. Why is there greater
need to limit and control the relative weight of every conceivable factor
that might impact upon a federal judge's discretion? The effect has been to
reallocate judicial resources to minutiae and to relegate advocacy to the
manipulation of computer programs. In one recent California case, counsel
tied up a federal courtroom for three days to litigate the issue of whether a
defendant convicted of a firearms offense was a "collector" of firearms.',
Both sides summoned expert witnesses. The issue was of great consequence
to the defendant, since a favorable finding would result in a four level re-
13. See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate
Review of Sentences (Approved Draft 1968) (Appendix A collects the statutory provisions for appellate
review of sentences of thirteen states).
14. See Wichlens, Appealing a Federal Guideline Sentence: The Final Frontier, THE CHAMPION
(National Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers), Jan./Feb. 1992, at 34.
15. See United States v. Carroll, 893 F.2d 1502, 151 1-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (district court's determina-
tion that defendant did not accept responsibility for his actions when he entered a guilty plea in the
face of almost certain conviction was not clearly erroneous).
16. United States v. Tuttleman, C.R. 89-20099 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
[Vol. 29:899
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duction in the offense level. 7 A whole body of appellate case law is now
developing around the issue of who is a firearms "collector. 1 8 Judge Wil-
kins would argue that this is an improvement over the old system, where a
judge wouldn't even articulate what difference it made in the sentence
whether the defendant was a "collector" or not. It is not fair to ask
whether we were not better off leaving judges a spectrum of discretion to
address a question such as this? "Collectors" come in all shades. A fairer
sentence might result from a process in which the judge does not have to
resolve a factual dispute "yes" or "no," but can simply give it the weight
he or she deems appropriate. Apart from the question of fairness, there is a
question of simple efficiency. The more factual findings we require to sup-
port a sentencing determination, the more judicial resources we will con-
sume in resolving them, at both the trial and appellate levels.
While it may be impertinent to suggest that infused wisdom does not
begin and end inside the Capital Beltway, there may be some valuable les-
sons to be learned from the sentencing systems developed by many states.
While the California system of determinate sentencing is far from perfect,
it has achieved a high level of consistency within a relatively simple and
understandable system. A judge is given a choice of three sentences for
each offense with the presumption that the middle level will ordinarily be
utilized. The factors that produce adjustments up or down under the Fed-
eral Guidelines are broadly categorized in the California system as aggra-
vating or mitigating factors. A California sentencing judge is simply called
upon to hear and weigh these factors. If aggravating factors outweigh miti-
gating factors, the upper level sentence is imposed. 9 If mitigating factors
outweigh aggravating, the lower level sentence is imposed. No one needs a
slide rule, and disparity is kept within manageable parameters. Judge Wil-
kins suggests that we compare the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to the
"old system" they replaced, rather than comparing them to some "perfect"
system. I would suggest we look to the fifty states comprising the "labora-
tories" of our federal system. We will find several examples of rational
sentencing systems that preserve judicial discretion while controlling un-
warranted disparity. And they accomplish these goals without creating a
monstrous bureaucracy to crank out regulations, amendments and charts at
17. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 2K2.1(b)(1).
18. See United States v. Buss, 928 F.2d 150, 152 (5th Cir. 1991) (former felons cannot possess
firearms even for recreation or collection, although they can legally use firearms for same); United
States v. Prator, 939 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (felons are entitled to reductions when their posses-
sion of firearms is for sport or recreation); United States v. Smith, 914 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Dinges, 917 F.2d 1133, 1135 (8th Cir. 1990) (in light of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms' ban on assault rifles, court determined that possession of assault rifle is not for sport or
collection).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 1990).
1992]
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a faster rate than the Internal Revenue Service.
Finally, Judge Heaney's study verified the problem of racial disparity
prevalent under the Guidelines. I strongly suspect that this trend is a na-
tional phenomenon, not confined to the federal system at all. Here in Cali-
fornia, a recent "Blue Ribbon" Commission on our prison inmate popula-
tion revealed that the racial composition of our burgeoning prison
population has changed dramatically in the past decade. In 1981, the
prison population in California was thirty-six percent white and sixty-four
percent minority. In 1989, after the total prison population nearly tripled,
the proportions were thirty percent white and seventy percent minority.20
What this data suggests to me is that the current "drug war" which is
filling our prisons at unprecedented rates is a war with serious racial un-
dertones. The heaviest sentences are going to the addicts and street dealers
who belong to racial minorities. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, while
facially neutral, contribute to this process in some insidious ways. For ex-
ample, in setting the base offense levels for various categories of drugs, the
guidelines create a one hundred to one ratio between "crack" cocaine and
ordinary cocaine. 1 This means that the Guideline sentence for a white de-
fendant selling one ounce of powdered cocaine on Long Island is level four-
teen (fifteen to twenty-one months) while the Guideline sentence for a
black defendant selling one ounce of "crack" cocaine in Harlem is level
twenty-eight (seventy-eight to ninety-seven months), assuming neither have
prior convictions. The Guidelines do not distinguish between white and
black defendants, but sociologists and criminologists will verify that use
and distribution patterns for "crack" cocaine closely track inner city ethnic
and racial lines, just as do distribution patterns for many other drugs.22
The federal courts have generally upheld the Guidelines distinction, 3 but
the Federal Sentencing Commission should take little comfort from the
fact that its distinctions survive the minimal scrutiny of a "rational basis"
test. Perhaps it is time for the Commission to look beyond the media drug
hype24 and start looking at the actual impact of the sentencing distinctions
20. STATE OF CALIFORNIA. BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON INMATE POPULATION MANAGEMENT, FI-
NAL REPORT 30 (1990).
21. GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 2Dl.l(a)(3).
22. See, e.g., Michael Z. Letwin, Report From the Front Line: The Bennett Plan. Street-Level Drug
Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 809-16 (1990).
23. United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1096 (5th Cir. 1991) (distinction between crack and
cocaine passes the rational basis test because crack is arguably stronger and more addictive than co-
caine); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Turner,
928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-79 (8th Cir.
1990) (same); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (same); State v. Russell,
447 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (striking down statutory distinction between crack and cocaine under
Equal Protection Clause of State Constitution).
24. See ARNOLD S. TREBACH. THE GREAT DRUG WAR 5 (1987); Gerald F. Uelmen, When Supreme
[Vol. 29:899
HeinOnline  -- 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 904 1991-1992
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
they created. Judge Heaney's evidence of racial disparity may reflect a
complex variety of factors, but one of those factors is certainly the impact
of classifications and distinctions among drugs created by the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are another sad example of the all
too common American phenomenon of constructing remedies that are
worse than our diseases. The disease of drug addiction, for example, has
spawned a law enforcement/drug testing complex that puts the military/
industrial complex to shame." The "complex" has become self-perpetuat-
ing, investing as much energy and effort in preserving and justifying itself
as in fighting the disease that led to its creation. The problem of sentencing
disparity under the "old system" was hardly deserving of characterization
as a "disease." It was more like a persistent case of athlete's foot. To erad-
icate it, we created a federal bureaucracy which seeks to ration justice by
quantifying and litigating every conceivable variable that might affect the
exercise of sentencing discretion. That bureaucracy has spawned treatises,
computer programs, training courses, and volumes of appellate opinions,
without bringing us any closer to our ideal of justice. Judge Heaney's study
confirms what hundreds of federal judges instinctively recognized: this en-
tire enterprise is actually institutionalizing greater injustice, by shifting
sentencing power away from a neutral and independent judiciary into the
hands of government advocates with political agendas. Our cure is truly
worse than the disease we sought to remedy. Surely, we can do better,
perhaps by doing less.
Court Justices Enlist in a War, THE CHAMPION, April, 1991, at 14; Adam Paul Weisman, I Was a
Drug-Hyvpe Junkie, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1986, at 14 (how the media is "addicted" to the drug
crisis in America).
25. The term "drug abuse industrial complex" was coined by the National Commission on Mari-
juana and Drug Abuse, which produced the only rational government study of drug abuse ever pub-
lished. SECOND REP. OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE. DRUG USE IN
AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 3 (1973). The report, and its advice, have largely been ignored at
the federal level, and the report has never been cited or referred to in any opinion of the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Uelmen, supra note 24, at 16,
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